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Sub-Saharan Africa is currently urbanizing at the fastest rate the world has ever seen, and with 
that comes challenges regarding housing, infrastructure, agriculture, industrialization, and 
service provision. This thesis analyzes trends of urbanization on the continent through the lens of 
three of the more developed countries—South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya—with a focus on how 
urban development via privatization, tech advancement, and foreign trade relations affects spatial 
inequality, the informal economy, and the environment. 
This thesis argues that while ground-up development and privatized service provisions 
fill the void left by a lack of government funding and programs, they also lead to further 
inequality. Instead, Western development ideals are best combined with solutions generated by 
the common people that preserve Africa’s informal economy, call upon its cultural legacy of 
kanju, and build upon pre-existing cities through regeneration efforts. Additionally, a focus on 
technological advancement and production of renewable energy offers a means for the region to 
bypass the negative consequences of industrialization and enables the population to grow in a 
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Chapter I: Trends of Urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Introduction 
 
At the turn of the 20th century, only 15% of the global population lived in cities. It was 
not until the 1950s that urbanization began to take hold in the developing world. As of 2018, 
more than 55% of the population lives in cities, including 81% of people living in high income 
countries. By comparison, only 40% of people in Sub-Saharan Africa live in cities (United 
Nations Population Division, 2018). Sub-Saharan Africa is defined as the countries of the 
African continent located south of the Sahara Desert. This percentage is expected to change as 
the African continent is currently urbanizing at the fastest rate the world has ever experienced. 
Nigeria alone is expected to have 400 million inhabitants by mid-century and currently has an 
urbanization rate of nearly 5% annually (World Bank, 2019). In this same timeframe, the United 
Nations predicts that there will be seven African megacities, including Lagos and Johannesburg, 
with populations of more than 20 million (United Nations African Renewal, 2019). Africa’s 
population is projected to double by 2050 (United Nations African Renewal, 2019).  
Sub-Saharan Africa has reached the point of mass urbanization before countries have had 
the opportunity to industrialize. Infrastructural flaws and extreme inequality that exist throughout 
the continent are being exacerbated by this rapid growth, as can be seen in the three countries 
analyzed in these thesis—Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa. These countries are also at the 
forefront of technological advancement, renewable energy, and ground-up development and 
offer a glimpse as to where trends are heading, illustrating the need for public-private 
partnerships focused on sustainability and renewable energy.  
 








Figure 1: Urban Growth of Lagos, Nigeria, 1900–2015. This map shows when areas of Lagos, the largest city in 
Nigeria, were developed and what the urban population was at the time. The rate of growth is nearly exponential and 
is projected to increase along a similar trajectory over the coming decades. (http://futurecapetown.com) 
 
Nate Laurel first coined the distinction between “developed” and “developing” as fat and 
lean, respectively. In a fat economy, like that of the United States, abundance and 
overconsumption is commonplace and problem-solving goes beyond the basics of sanitation, 
vaccination, and electrification. By contrast, nearly all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have lean 
economies and are considered to be Least Developed Nations, where average gross national 
income is just $1,200 per capita compared to $41,000 in the USA (UNCTAD, 2019). The 
difficulties stemming from this do have a silver lining, however. African individuals waste less 
food, owe less money, and maintain the lowest carbon footprint in the world. This thesis does not 
argue that all government, aid, and modernity is bad for Africa, but rather exposes how formality 







bias holds back progress through the tendency of outsiders to recognize solutions to African 
problems only when they come from governments and other formal organizations. This thesis 
aims to answer the question of how can formal and informal development coexist to foster an 
innovative and sustainable urban future for Sub-Saharan Africa. Fat economies must learn from 
the innovations of lean economies and the ethos of doing more with less—less time, less energy, 




Chapter I introduces the region of focus and describes the challenges of urbanization that 
Sub-Saharan Africa faces. This chapter sets up the dichotomy between formal and informal 
development and sets the stage for further discussion.  
Chapter II will deconstruct common misconceptions and stereotypes about African 
countries and their populations. After this, the informal economy that is so prominent in much of 
the continent will be explained and analyzed. Next, aspects of economic mobility and class 
distinctions will be discussed before ending with a section on the ever-increasing amount of 
economic segregation and inequality.  
Chapter III will go on to discuss the several types of development across the continent 
ranging from private satellite cities, new technopolises, and Chinese-owned Special Economic 
Zones. This chapter will focus on how these projects alter urban life and how new developments 
alter pre-existing cities and communities. This will be followed with details on aspects of 
gentrification, urban renewal, and foreign-owned infrastructure. 







Next, Chapter IV will delve into the prospects of technological advancement as a means 
to work around formal systems of development and bypass the harmful effects of 
industrialization. This chapter focuses on the challenges faced by Africans and compares global 
energy usage, with examples ranging from mobile banking in Kenya and undersea cables in 
Nigeria to hydroelectric power in South Africa. This chapter discusses many recent development 
successes around the continent with prospects for the future of continuing the trend of 
decentralization.  
Finally, Chapter V serves as a final comparison of development and innovation and the 
conclusion of my findings.  
 
Argument and Approach 
 
Formality bias is at the heart of the struggles of African development. Foreign 
governments, economists, developers, and philanthropists focus on Africa’s formal organizations 
and formal solutions, when the most vibrant, authentic, and economically significant interactions 
are between individuals and decentralized groups within the informal economy. To understand 
this, deconstructing stereotypes, understanding local economies, and seeing what is needed on 
the ground has the potential to achieve more, better, and faster results for sustainable 
urbanization. Once outsiders better understand daily life for average citizens and the differences 
between formal and informal economies, a more well-rounded perspective on African 
development can be achieved.  
I argue that due to Western focus on governance and foreign aid, informal social 
adaptation and individual dynamism have been obscured from view even though they are driving 







African development. Africans are finding innovative solutions toward a path to progress for 
themselves. I want to emphasize the resilience, innovation, and impassioned community leaders 
of Sub-Saharan Africa by portraying local solutions to the increasingly globalized challenges 
Africa faces. I aim to challenge the common belief that megacities are the way of the future and 
propose an alternative that consists of regionalism and less dense urban agglomerations, where 
urbanization is guided by informal development and local solutions. This thesis is formatted by 
topic to point out the widespread trends of the region as a whole rather than discussing 
development on a country-by-country basis. 
This thesis will discuss the ways in which reliance on the formal economy and conflict 
between formal institutions and an informal way of life has led to weak service provision, 
increased inequality, and an entire society working toward non-governmental solutions. Lack of 
service provision has been an issue affecting all social classes, but urbanization enables the 
wealthy to purchase private solutions and take the highest tax bracket away from existing cities 
as the elite move to new enclaves. Satellite cities, gated communities, and special economic 
zones allow foreigners and wealthy Africans to work within formalized systems and receive 
services and benefits through private means. This process excludes the vast majority of Africans, 
who cannot afford to live in these developments.  
Outside these new, exclusive developments remains a multifaceted informal economy 
filled with innovative minds seeking solutions to the struggles of life in urban Africa. I argue for 
the notion of smaller, more manageable cities grown through investment in pre-existing urban 
areas rather than continuing the trend of “clean slate” development and never-ending peripheral 
growth.  









Figure 2: Aerial View of Spatial Inequality in South Africa. This photograph shows two worlds existing 
simultaneously on the same land mass—high-quality infrastructure, greenspace, and large properties right next to 




In this thesis, I use cases from Nigeria, Kenya, Mozambique, and South Africa as primary 
examples to critically analyze the distinct types of urban development occurring in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and examine the clashes between formal and informal economies. All three countries have 
ground-up developments in the works to accommodate a burgeoning urban population and face 
similar challenges and opportunities associated with development.  
I use academic literature, news media, and sources from the ground from each country to 
examine the history of regional development in Africa and how it rapidly became global and 
interconnected to international trade. I investigate trends in development across the continent—
from affordable single-family homes to massive mega-projects spanning miles—and correlated 
exacerbations of inequality due to privatization, land grabbing, and resentment toward the 
informal economy.  







To identify and differentiate aspects of formal versus informal economies, I analyze 
sources in which lower income Africans discuss day-to-day life and the challenges they face 
regarding urban living, weak service provision, and displacement. I focus specifically on how 
individuals navigate informality and create unique solutions such as mobile banking, modular 
low-income housing, and solar lamps out of necessity.  
I also analyze sources that promote mega projects for ground-up development and gated 
cities as the solution to the alleged failures of African cities. The selected sources include official 
publications released and circulated by the government, interview transcripts, direct quotes from 
major news outlets, and books and scholarly articles by experts in the field.  
I aim to analyze and uncover the consequences of exclusionary ground-up development. 
While these new developments offer safer, secure environments where a formal economy can 
function, they do not solve transportation, housing, and environmental issues that pre-existing 
cities will be left to face. They also enable a mass exodus of wealthy and upper income Africans 
that is eerily reminiscent of the White Flight that plagued American cities in the mid-20th 
century and threatens the longevity of pre-existing cities (Manning-Thomas, 2012).  
My research shows that the bulk of physical development on the continent is private or 
multinational, while the most useful solutions to housing crises, climate disasters, and 
agricultural issues have been spearheaded by individuals who must deal with the effects daily. 
Formality defined as structured, often global economic systems, and informality which includes 
every aspect of unregulated economic activity such as gig economy jobs, are at odds with one 
another, and while these two worlds develop simultaneously, many people will be left behind. 







This realization across the continent has led to informal non-governmental solutions that aim to 




My research aims to analyze the trends of African development and is stated in the 
introduction to the thesis along with a discussion of my argument and a description of the 
methodology. In the following chapter, misconceptions and stereotypes about the African 
continent will be addressed before delving into what the informal economy entails. The concepts 
of ground-up development, the informal economy, and technology as means to bypass the harms 
of industrialization are critical to understanding the case studies carried out in this thesis. The 
case studies and entire thesis illustrate the polarity between economic systems and the 
inequalities being heightened by exclusionary development in Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa. 
  







Chapter II: Understanding Sub-Saharan Africa 
 




When westerners imagine Africa, most will picture endless grasslands where wild 
animals roam free. In reality, almost all Africans would need to visit a zoo or go on a safari to 
see something like that. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Kenyan author Binyavanga Wainaina 
discusses the idea of two parallel Africas. One Africa is the one he knows, an urban Africa, while 
the other is a wild Africa where people live amongst wild animals in complete poverty. Wainaina 
is a very outspoken and opinionated man who wants the dialogue about Africa to change. While 
discussions related Africa often center around AIDS, disease, and food or water insecurity, 
Wainaina is outspoken in insisting that broader discussion is needed to address how hundreds of 
millions of people are going to urbanize in the next few decades without destroying the planet 
with pollution and how city planners can allow informal economies to continue and even thrive 
(Wainaina, 2006). 
The most common misconceptions about Africa include but are not limited to the 
following: Africa is a country, everyone in Africa is poor and black, Africa is dangerous, and, 
finally, there are no cities in Africa and if there are, they are examples of failed urbanism (Teferi, 
2016). While some stereotypes may contain aspects of the truth, generalizations, wariness, and 
doubt are inhibiting development and perpetuating the widespread misunderstanding of African 
countries. 







 African Studies expert, Martin Murray, argues that when people do discuss African 
cities, there is an “exclusive obsession with urban pathologies and enduring failures—to the 
exclusion of almost everything else—[that] reduces city life in Africa to a dystopian nightmare, 
where the eschatological evocation of urban apocalypse feeds into the one-sided perceptions of 
those ‘Afro-pessimists’ who suggest that cities in Africa, like Africa as a whole, are so 
hopelessly chaotic and disorderly that they are beyond redemption” (Murray, 2015). While 
poverty and crime are issues across Africa, as they are around the globe, they do not affect every 
area of the continent like many people imagine. For example, Luanda, Angola, is home to the 
richest woman in the world and Kigali, Rwanda, is the 9th safest city on the planet (World Bank, 
2018). Konza City, an area South of Nairobi, Kenya, is considered the Silicon Savannah and is 
home to a bustling tech industry while the Nigerian city of Lagos, West Africa’s new art 
destination, is a sprawling megacity with a generation of artists, gallerists, and collectors 
powering the scene (Mitter, 2019).  
The drastic social and geographical differences between African cities undermines logical 
plausibility to create stereotypes about what a city in Africa truly looks like. Some cities are on 
the coast, along rivers, in the mountains, and even on the edge of deserts. African cities contain 
remnants of colonization seen in the architecture; many include skyscrapers, gated communities, 
and shopping malls; and others have famous ancient sites such as the Pyramids of Giza. African 
cities are also extremely diverse, home to people from around the African continent and around 
the globe. Durban, South Africa, is a fitting example. The city’s population is 20% South Asian 
and 8% European and more than eleven languages are widely spoken (Durban Urban Report, 







2007). Generalizing African cities is impossible due to their extreme diversity and the nuances of 
their economies, histories, and governments. 
African urbanization has the potential for many benefits, including swift growth of the 
middle class, an increase in education, and further access to a globalized world (Simone, 2004). 
Yet, urbanization also carries some downsides. While poverty in rural Africa decreases, urban 
slums rapidly grow and continually become harder to manage. Aid that is sent to Africa rarely 
reaches the slums and semi-urban peripheral areas of cities, which are the areas that need 
investment the most. Instead, western states and private sector actors are focusing their activity 
and aid within the centers of cities like Abuja, Lagos, and Nairobi, where the corporate and 
political elite reside and work (Salih, 2014). Private sector collaboration with these urban 
governments privileges corporate interests over the interests and wellbeing of the total 
population.  
The many stereotypes that exist about Africa lead to misconceptions about what is 
needed. The reality is that half of Africans live in cities, and that number is increasing 
exponentially (World Bank, 2019). The bulk of African urban development is focused on vanity 
projects, satellite cities, and foreign-owned planned cities. Instead of fixing preexisting issues, 
investments are put toward creating new cities to avoid facing the real problems that average 
people in Africa face. While these planned cities are modern and claim to offer tons of new jobs, 
scholars widely contest whether these plans will succeed and whether they will allow for 
people’s current ways of life to continue. New cities undermine the established way of life and 
the informal economy that many people rely on by forcing residents to adapt to formalized 
systems through the imposition of Western ideals and standards. 








Understanding the Informal Economy 
To many outsiders, African cities serve as examples of failed urbanism, filled with 
poverty, crime, and a backwards way of life. They may differ from Western cities with regard to 
economy, layout, and political structure, but while many cities across Africa are struggling and 
poorly governed, they are not as obsolete as many foreign developers claim. Africa’s cities 
function largely through fluid, makeshift collective actions running parallel to proliferating 
decentralized local authorities, small-scale enterprises, and community associations. Master 
planned cities disregard the distinct characteristics and unique attributes of history and culture in 
these places and, by excluding the informal economy, erase a way of life that has dominated for 
generations.  
The key to understanding urban African, is realizing that the majority of jobs in Africa 
are linked to an informal and unregulated economy which means that most people do not have a 
set, stable income. Simply put, “The kinds of unregulated production, distribution, and service 
provision vary widely from city to city throughout the African continent. Likewise, the incomes 
they yield and the positions they occupy in relation to legal regimes and law enforcement defy 
simple classification” (Murray, 2013). This type of informal and unregulated economy creates 
many challenges to the development of cities, including a loss of tax revenue, which limits 
government capabilities to provide social and infrastructural services. This is one reason new 
cities are so appealing: they would have a fresh start and avoid some of the issues associated 
with informal economies. This westernized form of development, however, ignores the lower 
income people of the city and their current way of life (Rijn, 2015).  







Spatial inequalities are ever increasing in African cities as quality of life and access to 
services vary at an almost unfathomable level. This polarization is created through limited access 
to natural resources and white-collar corporate jobs and creates a dichotomy in the demands and 
political preferences of urbanites. Wealthy groups of people can use capital and private 
investment to obtain goods and services that are normally the government's responsibility to 
provide. In doing so, these people maintain ultimate control over when, where, and for whom 
these goods are distributed (Mlambo, Kushamba, and Simawu, 2018). With decreased reliance 
on the government, the wealthy no longer need to prioritize things such as infrastructure and 
sanitation when choosing an elected official (Adama, 2012). Instead, aspects of international 
relations, taxation, and corporate regulation will become of the utmost concern for this 
demographic, while lower income residents are left to fend for themselves as many basic service 
provisions become too costly.  
The creation of new cities coupled with privatization of service delivery does not offer a 
solution to the vast majority of urban residents across Sub-Saharan Africa (Murray, 2006). Other 
solutions for pre-existing cities, like implementing economic regulations such as taxation to 
collect capital meant for investment in infrastructure, are complicated by the informal economy. 
Due to the high percentage of urban populations living in slums, the only way to keep these cities 
alive through an immense period of exclusionary growth is to find a way to make the informal 
economy work for the government. In Africa, 81% of employment is informal, and the 
International Labour Organization “stresses the need to facilitate the transition of workers and 
economic units to the formal economy, to promote the creation, preservation and sustainability 







of enterprises and decent jobs in the formal economy and to prevent the informalization of 
formal economy jobs” (International Labour Organization, 2018).  
Shifting the economies of hundreds of millions of people from informal to formal will be 
a chaotic undertaking. A large informal sector is associated with low productivity, reduced tax 
revenues, poor governance, excessive regulations, and poverty and income inequality. A legal 
framework is necessary to develop informal markets in order to remove the formal market 
constraints affecting these informal enterprises (World Bank, 2018). A solution must include 
oversight of the informal economy so that people may maintain their way of life while the 
government collects minimal taxes to ensure basic service provision. This tax base from such a 
substantial portion of the population would amount to enough capital to jumpstart investment 
into the pre-existing cities (Olopade, 2014).  
Africa is faced with the triple threat issue of discovering new ways to move hundreds of 
millions of people into adequate housing while preserving their way of life without creating too 
much pollution. As more people continue to move to the cities, housing and infrastructure are 
going to become larger problems. The first step toward the advancement of African cities is to 
understand and acknowledge that their cities are not failures and figure out how to build a world-
class city based around African logic rather than following the steps of the west.  
The Middle Class Myth 
 
The world is entering a second round of mass urbanization, this time on a scale that has 
not been experienced before (Pieterse, 2014). To view African development through a Western 
lens is often problematic and inaccurate and focuses too heavily on what appears to be lacking. 
Instead, a focus on societal differences and the trends of the past few decades will show whether 







the emerging middle class is a myth or is indeed a reality that has the potential to incite 
widespread social and economic change. When discussing the African middle class, it must be 
noted that the majority of jobs in Africa are linked to an informal and unregulated economy and 
that most people do not have a set and stable income. Having an abundance of cheap labor and 
an abundance of resources to extract, the wealthy and the industrialized world rely on these 
inequalities to fuel consumer capitalistic society. The reality is that a true, growing middle class 
can never come from an economy based around exporting raw materials and will depend instead 
on further development, whether that be industrial or technological (Olopade, 2014).  
The growth of the African middle class is one of the most contentious current topics 
among scholars of African development (Stein, 2020). The African Development Bank defines 
the African middle class as those spending between US$2 and US$20 per day. In the developed 
world, this figure would be too low to be classified as middle-class spending, but the ADB 
deems this calculation appropriate due to the lower cost of living on the world’s poorest 
continent (Stein, 2019). While the purchasing power parity is real, calculations of actual costs of 
living must be accurate to understand the value of money in a specific location. According to 
Deloitte, the percent of the Sub-Saharan population considered to be middle class has been 
steadily rising from 111 million, or 26%, in 1980 to 151.4 million, or 27% of the population, in 
1990, with a further surge to 196 million in 2000 and a dramatic increase to 313 million in 2010 
equating to 34.3% of the population (Deloitte, 2012).  
South African political economy professor, Patrick Bond, argues that Africa’s rapidly 
growing middle class may be a myth—that only the upper class and lower classes are expanding 
and, with that, so is income inequality. Bond and Ncube’s data show that less than 5% of 







Africans spend more than US$20 and that the number is shrinking rapidly (Bond, 2017). Rural 
poverty is decreasing not due to an increase in wealth but rather to mass migrations to cities 
(Bond, 2017). Another potential explanation is that this false sense of economic growth could 
stem from the movement of the elite out of society and into separate enclaves. This results in the 
growth of informal housing and the informal economy. New jobs are seldom being created and 
FDIs rarely reach the populations that need them the most. The bulk of the investments made 
across the continent are benefiting the wealthy and the developed world while keeping the 
African poor impoverished. 
While some scholars argue that Africa’s middle class is growing quickly, all agree that 
the slums are growing faster (UNCTAD, 2020). An important question that must be addressed is, 
would African people prefer to live in low-income housing rather than slums? Further, are 
running water and electricity worth giving up the community that they built? (Rondinelli, D.A., 
1990). Low-income housing in these cities would be sterile and condensed, almost taking away 
the humanity and individuality of these homes. The United Nations through their Housing 
Department defines a slum as a household in which the inhabitants’ lack of access to improved 
water sources, improved sanitation facilities, sufficient living area, housing durability, and 
security of tenure (UNMDGI, 2020). Furthermore, without land ownership there is the threat of 
eviction and slum households are often excluded from the formal economy, causing residents to 
become socially outcast from the larger society while being subjected to greater instances of 
crime and other informal or illegal activities (UNMDGI, 2020). Additionally, without 
infrastructural services and maintenance, informally occupied properties pose greater risks of 







environmental degradation, especially if they were built in an already environmentally precarious 
area. 
 Similarly, Henning Melber argues that this distinction of the middle class is inaccurate 
and that it is fantastical to imagine how, based on the living costs in Africa’s urban centers, a $2-
a-day threshold drastically shifts someone from the $1.99 margin as criteria for poor into a 
middle-class existence. He further argues that “all those not starving are nowadays considered 
middle class and that it is unrealistic for the people of this income level to play a pioneering role 
in the continent’s future development” (Melber, 2016). Perhaps $2 a day can suffice for an 
individual in a remote region, but in Africa’s largest cities, $2 a day gets virtually nothing. The 
cost of living in cities such as Kigali, Luanda, and Kampala, for example, is as high as in New 
York, London, and Hong Kong (Olopade, 2014). The threshold of middle-class income defined 
by Deloitte would be considered a joke to those living in these cities, where a cup of coffee can 
cost more than $2 just as it would in the United States or Europe. Claiming that 34% of Africans 
are middle class is completely unrealistic, especially when that metric is based around false 
assumptions of what being middle class means in the African context. United States Data and 
Statistics projects that half of its citizens are middle class, and the United States is the richest 
country in history with a formal economy (US Census Bureau 2020). How is it possible that a 
continent with a collection of the world’s poorest countries, with economies that have not 
diversified, have a middle class only 16% smaller than a global powerhouse? Africa has a 
population of four times that of the United States. On this scale, there would be more than double 
the amount of middle-class people in Africa than in the United States, which is absolutely not 
true. 







Some other common defining characteristics of the middle class are the widespread 
ownership of major household durable goods, such as refrigerators or automobiles, an increase in 
recreational time, and political influence (UNCTAD, 2020). These characteristics are 
comparatively lacking in what is considered Africa’s middle class (Stein, 2019). In Kenya, there 
are only 30 cars per 1,000 inhabitants, a number that has remained stagnant for the past decade 
(Deloitte, 2019).  This concept of a class defined by consumption patterns implies a considerable 
homogeneity, not only regarding socio-economic position, but also with respect to lifestyle, 
attitudes, and political aims. 
 While there has undoubtedly been economic growth and the movement of millions out of 
poverty, claiming that 34% of people are now middle class is ludicrous (Olopade, 2014). 
Another metric for measuring a population’s economic growth is through the usage of 
telecommunication services. In the past, this major increase in phone ownership would signify 
increasing disposable income, but in reality, this becomes decreasingly true as reliance on and 
need for smartphones increases. Today, one billion Africans have a subscription to a 
telecommunication network, and that number is increasing, especially in rural areas. Rural areas 
are not becoming more affluent, but rather phones are becoming more of a necessity, especially 
as mobile banking takes over as the primary form of transaction (Deloitte, 2016). It is common 
for entire families to share one mobile device while each person possesses their own refillable 
SIM card (Olopade, 2014). Remittances from abroad also skew the reality of economic growth in 
Africa because that increased capital is not gained through the creation of higher paying jobs but 
instead results from increasing brain drain from the continent.  







Much of the hype surrounding Africa’s growing middle class is misunderstood and does 
not actually signify the extreme economic growth that many presume to be the case. Despite this, 
the middle class myth is driving development and foreign investment that is reshaping the urban 
landscape of Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Economic Segregation 
 
The current state of urbanism in Africa is one of the least disputed topics, and scholars 
agree that problems include overcrowding, poor infrastructure, lack of land-use planning and 
code enforcement, and increasing traffic congestion; however, these scholars vary in their 
proposed solutions (Davis and Monk, 2007). Urbanization policies in Sub-Saharan Africa appear 
to prioritize multinational corporations and the upper class over the needs of the vast majority. 
African governments will exacerbate this trend if they continue to focus on providing for the 
private sector. This proves eerily reminiscent of white flight and mass suburbanization seen in 
the United States during the mid-twentieth century as classes clashed (Manning-Thomas, 1997). 
Even if the number of people with a middle-class income is not as high as some scholars might 
argue, there are large economic shifts occurring that have the potential to lead to some profound 
social changes.  
This paper argues that weak state capacity contributes to spatial inequality due to 
governments and wealthy individuals turning to private sector actors to effectively provide 
formerly public works, thereby creating wealth-based exclusionary tactics. In many parts of the 
continent, these exclusionary practices go a step further. A common trend in African cities is the 
relocation of wealthy individuals to gated enclaves often referred to as satellite cities. Many 
people with the means to are leaving urban centers for new developments due to crime, poor 







infrastructure, and a resentment for the informal economy (Murray, Myers, and Garth, 2006). 
This new era of urban regeneration differs from those of the past as the focus is on constructing 
entirely new cities from the ground up rather than rehabilitating the urban landscapes that already 
exist (Murray, 2013).  
One of the greatest challenges that comes from such a large informal economy is the 
small tax base, and satellite cities offer a solution for those with the means to relocate. As 
wealthy people relocate and privatize healthcare, education, and other utilities, governments 
suffer from the loss of their highest income taxpayers. Murray goes on to argue that there is a 
direct correlation between the increased creation of satellite cities and the deterioration of the 
existing built environment. If African governments focus on infrastructure for private 
development, low-income Africans and those working in the informal economy will undoubtedly 
be left behind. The private sector is already using its capital and influence to redesign the living 
situation of the elite, but this comes at a cost with virtually no benefit to the bulk of the 
population.  
Many authors argue that African cities are prime examples of “failed urbanism” and that 
this “clean slate” approach to development will allow city builders to bypass the current state of 
urbanism in Africa. If governments allocate their budgets to support privatized and exclusive 
urban planning, inequality will be exacerbated as those living in existing cities are 
disenfranchised. One argument is that these experiments of ground up development will offer 
postindustrial, hypermodern, high tech cities bustling with service industries and skilled workers 
who can live, work, and play in a “self-enclosed, safe, and secure environment” (Cox, 2006). 
Other scholars argue that the continent is not ready for a postindustrial era based on the idea that 







industrialization is the key to prosperity and wealth generation (Massoud, 2009). Data show that 
urban slums are growing exponentially and are becoming more challenging to manage and 
provide for, but instead of allocating funds to directly alleviate poverty and improve the lives of 
millions, money is being spent on vanity projects and ways to encourage future private 
investment (United Nations African Renewal, 2019; Murray, 2017).  
A more optimistic view is that, wherever there are jobs and a sense of opportunity, people 
will follow. This optimistic view on blank slate development means that the new roads to 
satellite cities might allow job seekers access to work in these new enclaves. However, this 
inevitably leads to informal fringe settlements that lack infrastructure and sanitation arising 
outside the gates of new developments, further exacerbating and displaying the extreme growing 
inequality. Most development projects on the continent only serve to improve the lives of the 
elite, while exploiting the readily available cheap labor of the informal economy. By privatizing 
the delivery of former public services, the areas predominantly filled with corporate citizens, 
which in this context often means those working within the oil, technology, and raw material 
industries, will be the only populations provided for (Massoud, 2009). This group has complete 
access to services such as sanitation, healthcare, and transportation within their formalized 
enclaves, while lower-income citizens within the semi-urban peripheral areas of the cities cannot 
afford the newly privatized services.  
 If this trend of relocation continues as it appears to be across the continent, a power 
struggle between the lower classes involved in the informal economy and the exclusionary upper 
class is inevitable. According to Acemoglu and Robinson, with democratization and 
redistribution of power increase as the middle class grows, wealth composition becomes more 







saturated and globalization increases (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2015). If this middle class is a 
myth, as wealth stays concentrated at the top and the wealthy remove themselves from civil 
society, those considered to be the middle class (those making more than $2USD per day) may 
still inherit the power that comes along with that title even without a substantial proportion of the 
wealth.  
This globalized, interconnected economic system stemming from the financialization of 
commodities ensures cheaper prices on manufactured goods by continuing exploitation of the 
cheap labor and capital-desperate economies across Africa. This is a difficult trap to escape due 
to reliance on foreign investment and continued mutually beneficial trade relationships, but 
African economies cannot industrialize or become self-sufficient on an export and extraction-
based economy. Agricultural and sustainability-focused investments have long maturing periods 
but will have extremely high payoffs for the continent and help move Africa away from its 
globalized trap and toward a path of self-sufficiency and economic freedom. A large issue is that 
foreign nations offer aid and loans in return for lower prices for raw materials and have no 
interest in altering current trade agreements. African nations that rely heavily on commodity 
exports are the most vulnerable to negative terms-of-trade shocks and commodity price 
volatility, which can negatively impact development through many channels (Stein, 2020).  
 
Conclusion 
The redevelopment of African cities is a massive undertaking that will require immense 
amounts of capital and many years to implement. African cities should not be compared to the 
cities of North America and Europe because nearly everything about them is different, including 







the economic systems and the definition of what it means to be middle class. The biggest 
obstacle facing African cities is that they are inherently different but, in order to start improving, 
those differences must be accepted rather than combatted in attempts to mimic Western 
development. The option of planned cities appears to be the easiest solution but essentially gives 
up on the millions of people who cannot afford to live in these cities.  
Author Dayo Olopade attempts to consolidate the struggles of living in Africa and the 
savviness that is developed as a result into a single term: kanju. She argues that living with 
uncertain electricity, clogged roads, and nonexistent social protections produces an extraordinary 
capacity for making do (Olopade, 2014). In Yoruba, kanju literally means “to rush or to make 
haste,” which Olopade argues includes creating practical solutions and doing more with far less. 
Kanju is born out of everything outsiders pity about Africa, such as lack of opportunity and 
choice, but these obstacles lead to an intense work ethic and products and people that are 
changing the trajectory of development. It is rare to hear about what ordinary Africans are 
already doing to help themselves, but resilience and pointed irreverence towards corruption and 
imposed institutions have led to innovations spearheaded by ordinary people in industries 
ranging from healthcare, film, and housing to tech startups and agricultural operations.  
It is important to note that kanju differs from resilience in that resilience entails returning 
to a prior status quo. Kanju is about leapfrogging ahead and generating new ways to problem 
solve in the face of insufficient resources and corrupt, ineffective central governments. This form 
of empowerment and practicality is out of alignment with much of the formal development 
occurring across the continent, which disregards the power of kanju and follows the status quo of 
Western-style development.    







Chapter III: Types of and Drive for Development  
Introduction 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa is facing several issues with regard to urban development, including 
lack of desire to live in pre-existing and growing megalopolises and the growing exclusionary 
trend of satellite cities and special economic zones (SEZs) (Chen, 2015). Even many rural 
migrants who have moved to cities feel a growing resentment toward urban life and desire to 
move back to the countryside due to less opportunity for self-sufficiency (Awumbila, 2014).  
In addition to privately run satellite cities and Chinese-owned SEZs, a third common 
form of urban development is small-scale neighborhood renewal. This chapter will discuss how 
these approaches came to be and analyze the socioeconomic impacts of each type of project. 
While there are other forms of urban development in progress, these three have only been in the 
works for a few decades and are relatively new to the continent. Comparing and contrasting these 
forms of development illustrates the ways in which trends of exclusion, exploitation, and 
privatization can have implications for the future of African urbanization.  
 
Satellite Cities: An Overview 
The controversial “charter cities” or “satellite cities'' movement, championed by 
economist Paul Romer, advocates a fundamental restructuring and regeneration of global 
urbanism (World Bank, 2019). Romer’s vision of the charter city mirrors the concept of a charter 
school. These spaces function as independent incubators of modern and cutting-edge urban 
planning, but not without their qualms. They are a bit of an homage to successful city-states such 
as Singapore or Hong Kong (Olopade, 2014). These cities come to fruition on the African 







continent through governments’ bestowal of virgin land for the purpose of building “urban free 
enterprise zones” that run according to the rules and practices that sociologists and economists 
see fit (Mallaby, 2010). Satellite cities offer orderly, globalized spaces that are not incorporated 
into the current systems, policies, or challenges of the host country. By building physical barriers 
and imposing formal economic systems, separate societies can exist in the same geographic 
location as extreme poverty and feel as if they are a world away.  
Romer’s vision includes mixed-use neighborhoods boasting ultramodern architecture 
with effective utilities for water and electricity. Each city will have location-appropriate industry 
in a space where “blackouts, bucket baths, begging, and crime will be no more” (Olopade, 2014).  
These cities physically exclude poverty from existing within their borders but do not actually 
create solutions to the rampant poverty that will exist right beyond the city walls. Like a charter 
school, Romer’s metropolis offers a gradual set of changes to serve as a counterpoint to the 
disorganized or corrupt status quo. Governments do not have enough resources to start 
improving cities on their own, which is why foreign investments and development of planned 
cities from the ground up serve as the most common solutions (Van Rijn, 2015). If young people 
opt into the charter city, it is an instant leap to a better life, but unfortunately, the bulk of 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa caters to multinational corporate investors, local business 
elites, and affluent consumers (Murray, 2015).  
As more people continue to move to cities, housing and infrastructure become larger 
problems. Until doing so proves profitable, it is extremely unlikely that the private sector will 
use its means to eradicate homelessness, decrease the number of informal settlements, and build 
affordable and efficient public transportation for urban Africans. Only through direct government 







intervention or a powerful public-private partnership will this type of infrastructure improve for 
average citizens. The lack of government service provision such as waste removal, reliable 
electricity, and public transportation, coupled with the elite class’s growing resentment for the 
informal economy, has led to these extreme measures of starting over. This process has been 
eased by the readily available exploitable worker from the informal economy and access to cheap 
land and building materials (Noorloos, 2017).  
Satellite cities are spreading rapidly around the African continent due to the appeal of 
privatization of all aspects of life to create an insulated community with a formal economy and 
top-tier service delivery. Satellite cities lessen the need for a national government because all 
goods and services, including healthcare, education, and waste management, are privately 
controlled within the city limits. Over the past two decades, satellite cities have emerged in every 
corner of the continent and are praised for being a successful option to bypass “failed urbanism,” 
a term touted by many scholars of African development in reference to the infrastructure and 
economic issues of preexisting cities (Murray, 2017). This “fresh start” approach to development 
allows city builders to circumvent the current state of urbanism in Africa by building 
comprehensively planned, self-contained enclaves from scratch.  
Although most planned cities are privately funded, they are inserted into diverse and 
dynamic political economies. These built environments tend to implement post-democratic, 
private sector–driven governance that makes them unsuitable for solving the service provision 
and poverty alleviation problems of urban Africa. Being so far removed from the realities of 
urban life in the host country, these communities will not face the same issues as the rest of the 
country and will continue to rely on the private sector for further development. They are 







essentially gated communities for the middle and upper classes with the potential to exacerbate 
urban inequality by increasing expulsions and enclosures of the poor, public funding injustice, 
and socio-spatial segregation and fragmentation (Noorloos, 2017). 
 
The Case against Satellite Cities  
 
So-called “Afro-pessimists” suggest that cities in Africa, like Africa as a whole, are so 
hopelessly chaotic and disorderly that they are beyond redemption (Garth, 2006). Arguments like 
this promote the idea that preexisting urban environments cannot be salvaged, which further 
promotes the belief that starting over is the only approach. However, African satellite cities will 
not solve the growing issues that urban Africa is faced with. Despite relying on cheap labor from 
nearby informal economies, they do not offer any form of poverty relief or even affordable 
housing and keep out poverty by physically excluding the impoverished. Far from a solution to 
urbanization challenges, satellite cities instead create a new and even more extreme form of 
economic segregation that offers a more efficient, formal, and privatized lifestyle for only the 
upper echelon of society.  
Even for those with the means to live in one, satellites cities are not without drawbacks. 
As African development scholar, AbdouMaliq Simone explains, “Cities are not closed spaces of 
confinement but open terrains of opportunities.” But, these planned cities are exactly the 
opposite (AbdouMaliq Simone, 2004). They offer little to no social mobility because in seeking 
to eradicate the issues of pre-existing cities and the informal economy, they monopolize and 
privatize every aspect of life in a contained space that can be easily monitored and controlled. 







This complete economic segregation stops any form of potential trickle-down economics and 
disenfranchises and excludes those who cannot afford to live in these bubbles.  
For example, Waterfall City, outside of Johannesburg, South Africa, owns everything 
from the water company and security to schools and restaurants. This development is also 
completely enclosed by a cement barrier and barbed wire fencing, which furthers the idea of an 
in-group and an out-group that is actively excluded and even feared. As African and urban 
studies scholar Martin Murray puts it, “In this instance the process of deterritorialization has 
resulted in an institutional vacuum that has enabled real estate developers at Waterfall City to 
effectively delink from the existing normative order of the ‘public city’ and to establish their 
own privatized regimes of centralized control... The planned rollout of Waterfall City signals 
how extraterritorial power can produce and justify a new kind of enclave urbanism that bears 
little relation to conventional practices of city building” (Murray, 2017).  
 
The Case for Satellite Cities 
 
A positive outlook on these developments focuses on the offerings of postindustrial, 
hypermodern, high tech cities bustling with service industries and skilled workers who can live, 
work, and play in a “self-enclosed, safe, and secure environment” (Herbert and Murray, 2006). 
Enclaves like Waterfall City are not just cities but rather machines (Murray, 2015). This kind of 
project reaps profit from every aspect of life and will act as a city-state. Every aspect of society 
is planned, mapped out, and there is little room for individuality. Formality through privatization 
and security will offer the stability that pre-existing cities on the continent currently lack but at a 
high monetary and social cost.  







Technology is also fueling hypermodern private development for both multi-national 
corporations and private satellite cities that would not be possible without the innovations of the 
past few decades. Sixty kilometers outside of Nairobi, Kenya, ground has been broken at Konza, 
Africa’s first Technopolis. It currently sits on an unoccupied 5,000-acre slice of the savanna. 
Global firms like Samsung Huawei and Toyota will set up offices there (Manson, 2013). 
Upwardly mobile Kenyans will buy homes built to their specifications with water, electricity, 
and high-speed rail. All the goods and services that the government has deprived ordinary 
Kenyans of will be diverted into the 20-year, 10-billion-dollar project. As a special economic 
zone, Konza will have preferential tax and zoning treatment that excludes informal settlements 
and reinforces formal economic systems (Manson, 2013). Technology and a globalized economy 
allow cities like this to exist in virtually any environment. As seen below, Konza City emulates a 
Western style of development that prioritizes autocentrism and corporate office space. It hopes to 
become a global city, and therefore the rendering of the city looks as if it could be anywhere in 
the world.  








Figure 3: Konza City Rendering. (Konza.co.ke) 
 
Informal Settlements and Second-Tier Cities 
As the trend toward satellite cities has swiftly taken off, with dozens of projects in South 
Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya, the number of slum dwellers IN Sub-Saharan Africa has 
simultaneously surpassed 200 million in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2019). The 
overcrowding of Africa’s largest cities creates a humongous drain on both public and personal 
resources, which further exacerbates the issues that informal settlements face. The truism of 
global urbanization seems to be “the coexistence of slum areas hobbled by limited public 
services and shelter and boundless disease and crime” (Vidal, 2010). Each major city focused on 
in this writing has its own infamous slum settlements: “Nairobi has Kibera, Baba Ndogo, 







Kawangware, and Mathare. Lagos has Makoko, the stilt city floating inches above the lagoon for 
which the city is named. Johannesburg has Hillbrow and Alexandra—crowded, dangerous, and 
omitted from the continent-leading formal economy” (Olopade, 2014). What is to say that these 
informal settlements will not relocate to surround the satellite cities that low-income residents 
will inevitably be called upon to build? This is already the trend in Johannesburg, where informal 
settlements encircle malls and commercial suburbs filled with “stylish apartments and vegan 
brunches for increasingly wealthy locals—black and white alike” (Olopade, 2014). While 
aspects of the satellite city may sound appealing and enable certain groups to move into the 
future, the projects do not offer a solution for the hundreds of millions of people who will not be 
able to afford to live there or a solution for the incomprehensible scale of urbanization, 
population growth, and subsequent sprawl of informal settlements the region has yet to 
experience.  
As an alternative to popular speculation by the United Nations that Africa’s largest cities 
will become megalopolises with upwards of 20 million inhabitants, the idea of “villagization” 
has been recently floated by scholars, including architect and urbanist Rem Koolhaas. 
Villagization refers to “the grouping of population in centralized planned settlements” that will at 
some point in time be connected by high-speed rail (Lorgen, 1999). This option places less of a 
burden on local urban governments by easing the strain of resources and lack of service delivery 
while also putting a damper on urban sprawl. In addition, Africa’s second-tier cities have long 
been overlooked. Places like Nakuru in west-central Kenya and Durban, South Africa, have 
booming populations but are not at the same scale as the continent’s largest cities. These cities 
have the potential to be better, offering residents more than a “hardscrabble slum experience… 







Seen in this light, the extraordinary realignment of Africa’s booming population is an 
opportunity like no other” (Olopade, 2014). Second-tier cities may prove to be the most 
important for lower income development, since cities at this scale and by virtue of their youth 
can be built better and out of more firm, efficient, and environmentally conscious materials. 
There is potential to introduce new technology into the existing urban landscape and to improve 
infrastructure there as opposed to building from the ground up. It is more environmentally 
harmful to start over than it is to rehabilitate what has already been built. Further, this method of 
improvement does not explicitly exclude the bulk of the population or force new economic 
structures upon people. Instead, it preserves culture and history and does not lead to extreme 
spatial inequality.  
 
Housing Crisis and Private Solutions: 
South Africa is a country where housing is a state-sanctioned right, meaning that every 
citizen is entitled to a shelter from the elements, a place to eat, sleep, relax, and raise a family 
(Pieterse, 2014). South Africa's government has fallen far short of its constitutional aspirations 
with more than 500,000 people on a waiting list for public housing in Cape Town alone 
(Olopade, 2014). Individuals on the waiting list have little choice over where they will eventually 
be settled, and housing has been described as “miserable tracts of government housing lining the 
outer rings [of the city]” (Olopade, 2014).  
Moladi, an affordable housing alternative, attempts to keep South Africa’s promise of 
housing by taking matters into their own hands. Moladi is an example of innovative consumer 
product development doing a better job at government provision. Slums will not just disappear, 







as much as the wealthy may wish they would, so instead, affordable housing must be built and 
designed better. Moladi offers privately run affordable housing with access to water, electricity, 
and choice within the reach of millions of those in the striving class. Moladi improves the old in 
South Africa by building dignified modular homes in under a week. Each structure is specific to 
the consumer’s needs, whether commercial or residential. “Trained contractors will set up the 
housing mold to accommodate plumbing and wiring and fill it with a concrete like mixture. After 
two days the walls are dried and done and the plastic vanished. No more unfinished homes will 
be saved for, brick by brick, no more porous scrap and mud walls putting families at the mercy 
of flooding, collapse, or otherwise” (Oh, 2015). Moladi proves that safe, affordable housing in 
preexisting cities is a possibility, and that there is high demand for such an option. Such 
improvements to the built environment are fundamental for evolving cities and the eventual 
eradication of slum settlements.  
 
Urban Renewal and Gentrification: The Case of Johannesburg, South Africa 
 
A common theme in African cities is that wealth and industry are leaving urban centers 
for suburbs and new developments due to crime, poor infrastructure, and a resentment for the 
informal economy; but, a major exception to this trend of diaspora is gentrification and 
neighborhood redevelopment (Nevin, 2015).  
Gentrification is complicated; it helps improve the economic stability and desirability of 
cities but often excludes those who cannot afford to be a part of it. Gentrification can be defined 
as the process of investment and development in low income and industrial areas that often leads 
to the displacement of residents. A reinvestment in declining urban areas and a decreasing 







amount of sprawl are the two largest benefits of gentrification. Sadly, lower income residents, 
oftentimes minorities and immigrants, are priced out of their homes and even forced to shut 
down their businesses. “Whether blatantly stated or not, city developers who are attempting to 
rewrite the city’s racial [and economic] spatial politics are doing so primarily through strategies 
of gentrification. And yet gentrification is a process that often re-inscribes formations of class 
difference, ultimately doing little to unseat South Africa’s urban inequality” (Nevin, 2015). The 
architecture and culture of a neighborhood are often what lead to the interest of real estate 
developers, and removing the people who make a place what it is, is not principled. 
One example of successful gentrification with limited displacement is the Maboneng 
neighborhood in Johannesburg. Maboneng is a multicultural area in the city center that offers an 
eclectic mix of visitors and residents. Maboneng is one of the most inclusive areas in 
Johannesburg, both racially and fiscally (Mela, 2015). Inner city Johannesburg is known to be 
extremely dangerous and impoverished, having experienced a mass exodus of wealthy people 
post-apartheid. But in Maboneng, “From what one can see, every ground floor retail space is 
occupied. There are many corner shops selling basic food and supplies, much of which is Halal. 
Furthermore, informal traders set up on the pavement, selling sweets, cigarettes, and a small 
selection of fresh fruit. Shop owners sit outside their shops too, chatting to the informal traders 
and to passers-by. Children join the throngs of people after school, and often sit on the pavement 
playing games, doing homework, or talking” (Nevin, 2015). Encompassing many aspects of 
African culture, using pre-existing infrastructure, and offering a safe, mixed-race neighborhood, 
Maboneng is a splendid example of how urban revival in Africa can look when pre-existing 
spaces are invested in rather than fled. Maboneng embodies Africa as a whole through its 







diversity and the way structure and informality coexist in a hybrid space that is both modern and 
historic. This neighborhood has a continued character and is an island of regulated mutuality. 
While this area is highly regulated just as other African urban enclaves are, it is not as blatant 
and discriminatory. The area caters to a young black middle class and offers a safe and open 
space for the LGBT community filled with shops, bars, restaurants, and street vendors. Spaces 
like this are not common in many parts of Johannesburg, especially in the surrounding 
settlements.  
“To make a good city,” Wilhelm-Solomon says, “the middle income and the rich must 
also be looked after in addition to the poor” (Solomon, 2016). Controversially, Liebmann 
questions whether the emerging neighborhoods of the inner city are the right place for everyone, 
or if “some people should be in the inner city and others should be on the outskirts of the city” 
(Walsh, 2013). In 1990s Johannesburg, the whites left the inner city and low-income black 
people moved in. Today, white suburbanites say, “I wanna live in a hip cool neighborhood like 
New York! Not my parents’ suburban house! And why shouldn’t I?” (Walsh, 2013). With the 
capital and power to gentrify inner city neighborhoods, wealthy and predominantly white South 
Africans want to take back parts of the city that their parents gave up for a suburban lifestyle of 
gated communities. The worry is that satellite cities and sterile, hypermodern environments may 
take away from the positive aspects, culture, and way of life that comes from unregulated and 
chaotic urban living. Johannesburg would benefit greatly from investment, but gentrifiers must 
ensure that lower income people are not displaced and neglected. Through rehabilitation, 
property rights assurance, and creation of mixed-used developments in pre-existing urban 
environments, this is possible.  







There is a current polarity between two groups of wealthy in Johannesburg: those who 
want to continue life in their “utopian enclaves” and those who wish to live normal lives in a safe 
neighborhood like Maboneng that is in a pre-existing city. The scene is explained by Martin 
Murray: “When the residents of these sequestered enclaves are forced to leave their safety zones, 
they do so within the protective armor of their cars, dreading every moment they are “out there” 
in the illegible public spaces of the city, exposed to the mercy of unknown predators who lie in 
wait for victims. In the popular imagination, these public spaces are the perceived “war zones” of 
the city— dens of iniquity and violence that threaten the very existence of those seeking a safe 
haven in their private fortresses” (Murray, 2008). The gated communities for the wealthy that 
surround Johannesburg offer a lumpy and disconnected environment. These enclaves are islands 
of wealth in an ocean of crime and poverty. The measures people take to remain separate from 
their old communities foster an increased fear of crime and poverty, which further promotes the 
desire for division and economic segregation.  
Another hybrid example of development is Melrose Arch, just north of inner-city 
Johannesburg. This community offers a genuine mixed use, urban development project with a 
focus on walkability and pedestrian-friendly environments where residents and visitors can live, 
work, and socialize in a safe and properly built neighborhood. As Johannesburg grows, it 
becomes more fragmented with mini urban centers and shopping malls instead of an 
economically healthy urban core. Compared to the “unfettered suburban sprawl and steady 
increase in the numbers of lookalike, gated residential estates on the metropolitan fringe,” 
Melrose Arch offers an improvement but still fail at achieving a mixed-income environment. In 
contrast to the stated goals of New Urbanism, Melrose Arch appeals to a narrow spectrum of 







income mixing in its client and customer base and very little class diversity in its residential 
components (Murray, 2013). This development offers a small solution to the scattered and 
disconnected enclaves that comprise upper class Johannesburg, but while Melrose Arch is not a 
gated community, it is also not an economically or racially inclusive place. Wealthy South 
Africans spend the vast majority of their time indoors or travelling from one protected space to 
another (Southern, 2018). The opportunity to walk freely and still feel protected is what is so 
appealing about Melrose Arch, and Maboneng as well.  
Even though apartheid ended nearly twenty-five years ago, Johannesburg is still 
extremely segregated, and racist policies toward black residents, men in particular, are carried 
out by private security companies. These private security and police companies have become 
commonplace in Johannesburg and in many satellite cities across Africa (Murray, 2017). The 
companies can ensure higher tech and reliable security methods while removing the threat of 
corruption and reliance on the state. These private companies have more data than the police, 
employ more than three times as many people, and are completely replacing public police in 
satellite cities. Private security companies do everything from removing squatters to preventing 
white collar crimes like embezzlement (Clarmo, 2013). These companies make up more than 2% 
of the South African GDP and benefit greatly from the “fear industry” (Murray, 2017). The fear 
of crime coupled with the desire to create a physical barrier between the outside world leads to 
the construction of gates and walls and the hiring of these security companies. For residents to 
feel safe, and to continue the separation of social classes, “Whether on foot or in a car, black 
males are stopped and questioned about their activities. They are often patted down, and their 
bags are examined. According to South African law, private security companies are legally 







allowed to stop people” (Clarmo and Murray, 2013) Private security is a way to ensure safety 
and protection but serves to prolong racial segregation and enforce economic segregation on a 
local scale.  
Post-apartheid Johannesburg has transformed into a maze of disconnected zones of 
wealth surrounding an impoverished and dangerous inner city. If trends continue as they are, 
with cities across the continent prioritizing vanity projects and the wealthy leaving for satellite 
developments, Johannesburg—which has seen the most Western influence and has been 
struggling with redevelopment for decades—should be viewed as a preview of what the future 
holds for urban Africa. African cities are building from the ground up, removing industry and 
wealth from cities by creating new spaces where the old city is no longer necessary. This is a 
new form of development that is completely different from the United States’ suburban model as 
urban life is still being prioritized, just on a new scale (Sawyer, 2021). Aside from gentrified 
areas, inner city Johannesburg has become a vertical informal settlement as squatters take over 
buildings. If mass vacancies arise in other African cities, they will be left with the situation 
Johannesburg is facing today, with the exception of race-related issues specific to Johannesburg 
that stem from apartheid.  
 
Chinese Involvement: Special Economic Zones and Infrastructure 
China currently exports $85 billion of goods to Africa annually and imports $62.8 billion, 
making them the continent’s largest trade partner. The motivations behind Chinese economic ties 
to Africa are comparable to those of the United States (Sun, 2014). One major similarity is the 
focus on extracting natural resources and raw materials from Africa to conduct value addition 







through refinement or manufacturing back in China. Nigeria, for example, does not have the 
capacity to refine their own oil, which creates the necessity for a multifaceted relationship with 
China where Nigeria has little bargaining power (Sun, 2014). There is a direct correlation 
between the aid and investment received by an African state and their cooperation with China on 
the political stage. The “no strings attached” policy led Nigeria to opt for a $9 billion Chinese-
led railroad extension in 2007 instead of a World Bank proposal that attached anti-corruption 
measures to their investment (Stein, 2020). Instead of trying to change or influence African 
policy, China would rather have allies on the international stage and ensure stable supply chains. 
Diplomatic relationships have involved African countries voting for China to host the Olympics 
and choosing not to recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state (Swaziland is the only remaining state 
that recognizes Taiwan) (Mlambo, Kushamba, and Simawu, 2018).  
Multiple reports claim special economic zones which are designated areas with unique 
rules and regulations that differ from those of the host country, “were intended to help China’s 
own restructuring, allowing the labor intensive, less competitive, ‘mature’ industries, such as 
textiles, leather goods, and building materials to move offshore” (African Development Bank, 
2010). Since these zones were initiated, they have not increased Africa’s 3% share in global 
commodity exports (ADB, 2010). Nigeria’s once thriving textile industry has become nearly 
extinct as refining cotton grown in Nigeria is cheaper to do in China or in SEZs (Stein, 2020).  
Much like the United States, China has capitalized almost exclusively on Africa’s 
comparative advantage in resource extraction. Petroleum makes up 62% of African exports to 
China, and ores and metals account for another 17%. In contrast, a third of Chinese products 
entering Africa are textiles, apparel, and footwear, and another third is machinery and equipment 







(Rotberg, 2008). China’s comparative advantage is also highlighted in their choice of trading 
partners, as the top 90% of export origins in Africa are oil producers (excluding South Africa, 
which almost exclusively supplies minerals and ore), while the recipient countries are far more 
diverse and determined by the largest accessible markets (Rotberg, 2008).  
The immediate question raised from this distinctly binary and extractive exchange is 
whether Africa will find it helpful and sustainable. Extractive industries have fewer development 
benefits than those that put more people to work, require more human capital, and have greater 
value addition (Al-Marhubi, 2000). This reality has pressed scholars and policymakers to 
investigate what effect Sino-African trade will have on future African product diversification. 
The current projection is that, because they supply complementary resources to one another, 
Africa will continue to be trapped as a resource supplier to China (Bruatigham, 2011). This is 
due to Africa’s comparative commodity advantage and because cheap Chinese manufacturing 
outcompetes African industrial efforts. South Africa’s government estimates that 60,000 people 
have been unemployed in the textile industry due to an influx of Chinese goods (Alden, 2006). 
Furthermore, China has been classified as a major threat to 82% of exports in Zambia, 73.4% of 
exports in Mozambique, and 64% of exports in Malawi (Mlambo, Kushamba, and Simawu, 
2018).  
 Fortunately, there are elements of this relationship that support a more positive outcome. 
First, natural resources could serve as a launching point for value addition. If African 
governments were to use their resource abundance and revenues from trade to move more of the 
supply chain into the continent, manufacturing more valuable goods such as aluminum would be 
possible (Rotberg, 2008). Second, it is possible that Chinese supply chains could loop back 







around to Africa as some more developed nations build vertical complements to Chinese 
products. In these cases, African countries use Chinese products as inputs and experience greater 
pay-off from fostering their own value addition. In the garment industry, for example, West 
African cotton is shipped to China for textile production and is then shipped back to Nigeria to 
be made into apparel (Brautigam, 2009). Machine equipment from China has a similar effect as 
it provides an input for growing African industries and is originally made from metals that other 
African states supply (Lawrence and Lawrence, 2010). 
Some of the most directly constructive investment initiatives have been in infrastructure 
projects, which lead to greater allocation efficiency, productivity enhancements, and a general 
acceleration of economic growth (Mlambo, Kushamba, and Simawu, 2018). Currently, the 
infrastructure financing gap stands at approximately $31 billion, creating a valuable opportunity 
for Chinese financing (Rotberg, 2008). Another major concern is that China is burdening Africa 
with debt. Around 20% of African external debt is owed to China, and China is the largest single 
creditor nation of the continent. The World Bank currently classifies 18 countries as being at 
“high risk of debt distress,” and the looming population crisis raises concerns over the long-term 
sustainability of this relationship (Rotberg, 2008). The globalized world relies heavily on these 
relationships. Current trade relationships and reliance on raw materials coupled with 
infrastructure development will make China’s relationship with Africa long lasting and 
inextricably link African countries with Chin, even if those countries become more self-
sufficient.  
 China’s growing relationship with Africa may not be set on equal terms, but in the long 
run, African countries will grow and prosper more than they otherwise would have without 







China’s investments, due primarily to the Chinese construction of highways, high speed rails, 
and ports (UNCTAD, 2018). Much to the dismay of many Kenyans, the new Standard Gauge 
Rail System that connects Nairobi, Kenya, to the coastal city of Mombasa is primarily for 
Chinese cargo rather than for the transportation of Kenyan people, which is a common trend of 
these infrastructure-for-commodity deals (Githaiga, 2019). China is providing countries around 
the continent with infrastructure that local governments would not be able to afford on their own, 
but these projects are creating jobs for imported Chinese laborers rather than local residents. 
While both sides benefit from trade relations, China has the upper hand especially due to the 
multi-year debt payment systems in place that many African countries will struggle to repay 
(Stein, 2020).  
SEZs offer a way for the Chinese government to avoid interaction and regulations put in 
place by the African country in which they are located. This phenomenon is quite like the 
satellite cities movement due to the arbitrary urban borders that these spaces dictate and the fact 
that the economy is formalized and unlinked to that of the host country. SEZs can bypass social, 
economic, and infrastructural issues but fail to offer a solution to the problems they are able to 
avoid. SEZs physically exclude local enterprises from operating within the zones, and the bulk of 
the housing and employment opportunities are for Chinese nationals.  
For example, the Lagos State government owns 40% of shares of the Lekki SEZ in 
Nigeria, but local manufacturers cannot access this site (Okeke, 2020). It appears that most 
African governments are satisfied with belonging to the SEZs’ company board or bilateral 
coordination committees rather than seeking larger roles for local manufacturers or supply chains 
due to the amount of infrastructure being built. Chinese involvement has not impacted 







employment rates or increased manufacturing on the continent and in fact has done quite the 
opposite (Okeke, 2020). SEZs amplify economic segregation, but the benefit of quality 
infrastructure appears to suffice for the blatant exploitation of African nations that China is 
involved in. The image of this severe spatial inequality will increasingly be defined by physical 
borders that encapsulate areas with their own economic laws such as SEZs and charter cities. 
 
Conclusion 
The types of development occurring in Sub-Saharan Africa vary greatly. Satellite cities 
offer infrastructure, private solutions to housing, and an escape from the informal economy that 
dominates society. From the outside in, solutions like these appear to solve many of the issues of 
urban life in Africa, but they also create a plethora of unintended consequences that will have to 
be suffered by those who cannot afford to opt out of pre-existing cities. As hundreds of millions 
of people urbanize, cities must keep up with demand but both local and national governments do 
not have the means to provide housing and other services to a growing population. This 
inevitably has led to a housing crisis and a trend of resentment among migrants toward their new 
urban life. Instead of the trend of increased spatial inequality prompted by megalopolises and 
sprawling urban slums, the solution may rest in a more natural gentrification process as seen in 
inner city Johannesburg. Rehabilitating pre-existing structures and focusing on the blending of 
social classes as opposed to further segregation and wasteful development embody the kanju 
spirit of living a more equal and sustainable lifestyle with far less.  
Similarly, a focus on regional governments and second-tier cities offers a more hands-on 
approach that utilizes a newer housing stock and an increase in rail infrastructure as opposed to 







the global trend of autocentricism. Another means of development is through special trade 
relations with China. While each country studied has independent deals, the idea is to trade raw 
materials, including physical land, for Chinese-built infrastructure that otherwise could not be 
afforded. The bulk of development, however—whether it be in the form of private cities or 
Chinese involvement—does not actually benefit the vast majority of Africans due to physical 
and economic exclusion, which is why many people have taken matters into their own hands as 
will be seen in the next chapter. Industrial history and modernization theory glorify organization, 
institutionalism, taxation, and the rejection of informality, but opportunity looks completely 
different in the lean economies of Sub-Saharan Africa. Faced with frustration and corruption, 
kanju allows for the creative destruction of low functioning institutions through risk taking, 
creativity, and a characteristic hustle.  
  







Chapter IV: Technology and Renewable Energy as Means of 
Expediting Development  
Introduction 
 
This chapter will explore the plethora of challenges that Sub-Saharan Africa faces and 
will further discuss why the successful and sustainable urbanization of the African continent 
coupled with technological innovation is key to slowing the effects of climate change. Millions 
of people are migrating to cities on the world’s fastest growing continent. Each year more than 
thirty million Africans urbanize (Murray, 2015). With this comes a need for new infrastructure, 
including but not limited to roads, housing, airports, and sanitation facilities. Many of these 
migrants are leaving behind lives of subsistence farming. As of now, nearly every African 
country lacks the capability for large-scale industrial farming (Deveze, 2011). Without proper 
irrigation systems and pesticides, African countries have become increasingly reliant on food 
imports from abroad as climate change has increased the severity of droughts and floods, causing 
crop failure year after year across all parts of the continent (Stein, 2020).  
In addition, African states have been forced into a commodity trap, which has left them 
unable to industrialize due to the availability of cheaper goods from abroad. Raw materials such 
as crude oil, precious metals, and cash crops are exported and often reimported once in their final 
state. For example, Nigeria, one of the world’s largest oil exporters, imports nearly all of its oil 
from China (Hoffmann, 2015). China has created trade deals around the continent to receive 
crude oil in exchange for development in the form of infrastructure (Stein, 2020). This trade 
relationship is eerily reminiscent of the colonial period, according to Nigerian president 
Muhammadu Buhari (Olopade, 2014). Apart from Monaco, every wealthy state on earth has 







relied on industrialization to stimulate the economy (UNCTAD, 2015). African countries do not 
have the capital or the existing infrastructure needed to develop and industrialize if goods from 
abroad continue to be less expensive. Technology has the potential to offer a solution to this. 
Since satellites and undersea cables have been laid, “connections have offered millions the 
chance to depart their geography, class, religion, or culture and access a world out of their 
sight—but now within their reach” (Olopade, 2014). This chapter will further discuss the 
growing trend of non-governmental organizations and technology replacing the supposed roles 
























Figure 4: African Undersea Cables, 2023.  This map shows the projected undersea cable network for Africa in 
2023. (Ustic.gov) 
 







Connection to the internet and the ability to share information instantly has the potential 
to allow Sub-Saharan Africa to leapfrog to the next stage of development. Internet restrictions 
and usage laws in Kenya, South Africa, and Nigeria are comparable to those of the US, and each 
country is ranked similarly on Freedom House’s assessment of online freedom (Freedom House, 
2020). This not only has positive implications for poverty relief and physical development but 
also for mitigating the effects of climate change and refocusing on renewable sources of energy. 
The foundation of these undersea cables offers an almost overnight change for the populations 
that gain web access from them. Access to remote virtual jobs, unlimited access to information, 
and instant communication now link these once remote places to the rest of the globe. 
Entrepreneurship in technology has the opportunity to replace or even direct industrialization and 
its environmentally harmful consequences in a different, more sustainable way. This chapter will 
discuss the ways in which technology and the threat of climate change will drive the future of 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa. While these are not specifically city-building projects, they 
have implications as to both how and why things will be built in the future.  
 
The Effects of Climate Change: Mozambique and South Africa 
The harsh effects of climate change are already being felt across the African continent. A 
prime example is the case of Southeastern Africa. Already one of the poorest regions on the 
planet, Mozambique and its border with South Africa is currently suffering from one of the worst 
droughts to date (FAO, 2017). In Southern Africa, there are more than fifty million food insecure 
people in a region already suffering from poverty, various conflicts, and previous natural 
disasters (McVeigh, 2018). In Mozambique alone, more than 1.5 million people are seeking aid 







due to the drought and the extreme harvest failure that it caused. The government of 
Mozambique currently estimates that 100,000 children will be malnourished because of the 
largest food shortage in decades (Kuo, 2019). Numbers this high have not been seen since the 
region’s previous record-breaking drought back in 1997–98 (UNCTAD, 2019).  
This drought is so detrimental because half of all crops grown in the region are rain fed 
instead of being watered through irrigation systems that are more abundant in the developed 
world (Anyadike, 2019). This method of cultivation has resulted in the death of half the crops 
grown for many seasons in a row. 2021 will be no different as 53% of crops are expected to fail 
(Anyadike, 2019). As urbanization rapidly continues and the population spikes, no Sub-Saharan 
country can afford to lose half of its crops, especially with a raw material–reliant export 
economy. For example, agriculture makes up more than 80% of the GDP in rural Mozambique 
(Stein, 2020). Droughts in general lead to malnutrition, exacerbated poverty, and a cost of an 
estimated $3.5 trillion USD to the global economy (World Bank, 2019).  
As demand for food increases, demand for land does, too. As virgin land continues to be 
cultivated, pastoral communities become less mobile and therefore more sensitive to drought. 
Already shrinking pastoral communities now face competition from the agricultural sector, the 
increasing amount of land conservation, and ground-up development projects that displace them. 
In addition, the population of Mozambique has more than doubled since 1990 and as a result of 
global population growth, global food production must increase 70% by 2050 to meet the 
anticipated demand (Stein, 2020). Mozambique and South Africa acted fortuitously following a 
series of cyclones, floods, and droughts that have worsened each decade. As a result, these 
countries have switched many crops to be more climate resilient. Sweet potatoes and maize have 







replaced native favorites such as cassava and batata potatoes. They can more easily survive the 
worsening conditions. Adaptations are being attempted wherever possible but without global 
cooperation, the effects of climate change will become more severe.  
Sub-Saharan Africa is faced with an unequal share of the global burden of climate change 
that has been made increasingly severe by the extreme amount of pollution created by and for 
wealthier nations. Mozambique is one of the lowest global contributors of CO2 emissions per 
capita and has invested heavily in renewable energy (Kuo, 2016). It has tried to do its part by 
using hydroelectric plants on the Zambezi River to mitigate CO2 emissions. Unfortunately, the 
2018 Indian Ocean Dipole has halted rainfall, causing the Zambezi’s water level to be lower than 
required to harvest energy, calling into question the future production potential of the 
hydroelectric plant (McVeigh, 2018). Even if Mozambique were able to have an agricultural 
revolution, the country’s largest freshwater source, the Zambezi, which South Africa also heavily 
relies on, is drying rapidly; without it, large scale irrigation would be nearly impossible. Without 
proper development and attention to emissions, environmental crises like this will become more 
commonplace around the world. Countries like Mozambique, among many other Southern 
African nations, will suffer some of the harshest consequences of the climate catastrophe despite 
the fact that they had extraordinarily little contribution to harmful emissions. Extreme drought in 
Southern Mozambique has led to over 355,000 internally displaced people who need immediate 
relief in the form of food and medical care (Stein, 2020).  
Humanitarian crises and natural disasters are becoming more severe and more frequent, 
and mitigating these effects of climate change will improve quality of life across the planet and 
will be profitable in the long run (Tucker, 2021). Sustainable and inclusionary development must 







occur while the agricultural sector adapts to serve a growing urban population. Self-sufficiency is 
one of Africa’s greatest challenges due to commodity traps, reliance on foreign aid, and a lack of 
infrastructure, but it is possible. The way the African continent develops will alter the fate of the 
world, especially regarding climate change and the potential resulting refugee crisis that would 
be worsened as a result. If Africa is developed like China and much of Southeast Asia, carbon 
emissions will surpass the appropriate level to keep temperatures from rising too dramatically. If 
renewable energy, technological advancement, and public transport can be prioritized over 
highways, cheap oil, and industrialization, the African continent has the opportunity to pave the 
way for a future of sustainable development and an increased focus on renewable resources.  
If Africa follows the developmental path of industrialization, the amount of pollution 
created would be unfathomable. Resource extraction, reliance on automobiles, and globalized 
shipping would all increase (Brautigam, 2004). Africa is in a tricky situation because the Earth 
cannot afford for the continent to contribute to pollution like previous nations did during their 
industrialization periods, and it is exactly through industrialization that the world has created 
capital and urbanized in the past. Africa is faced with the extremely complex and multifaceted 
issue of discovering new ways to move hundreds of millions of people into adequate urban 
housing while preserving their ways of life and without creating too much pollution, all while 
trying to appease foreign private investors.  
 
Renewable Energy 
The African continent is the global leader in renewable energy, with primary focus on 
wind, solar, and geothermal energy. Kenya, for example, gets half of its energy from geothermal 







sources (Stein, 2020). Historically, urbanization has offered opportunities for populations to 
become more efficient and sustainable due to higher density, less land use (including 
deforestation, single family homes, and highways), and public transportation (Vidal, 2010). The 
urbanization of Africa can set the stage for the future of sustainable development, or it can have 
irreversible and detrimental effects on people’s lives and the natural world. Sub-Saharan Africa 
is simultaneously the least developed global region and the global leader in sustainability and 
renewable energy. The percentage of the population with the lowest income is also the group of 
people with the smallest carbon footprint (Pieterse and Parnell, 2014). The sustainability sector is 
what African governments should be investing in as it is imperative to maintaining humanity’s 
current way of life. The sustainability and renewable energy sector will be one of the fastest 
growing fields on the planet, and for once, Africa has a head start. Successfully implementing 
long-term, sustainable urban design must be further prioritized to stop cities from decaying and 
to grow them as innovation hubs that can further transform development on the continent.  








Figure 5: Satellite Image of Light Pollution. Viewed from outer space, the illuminated industrialized world and 
major metropolises contrast sharply with the literal darkness that envelops Sub-Saharan Africa. (Nasa Earth 
Observatory: http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/NPP/news/earth-at-night.html) 
 
Only one in every three people in Africa has access to reliable electricity. Total 
generation power for the forty-eight countries in the region is equal to that of Spain (Eberhard 
and Shkaratan, 2012). World Bank figures suggest that the average use of basic electricity in 
high income countries is over 10,000 kilowatt-hours per person annually. The average African 
uses about twenty times less. New York’s 19.5 million people consume the same amount of 
electricity as all 800 million people on the African continent (World Bank, 2015). Sub-Saharan 
Africa is the only world region where per capita consumption of electricity is decreasing despite 
an increase in development (Kenny, 2011).  







Renewable energy forms such as hydroelectric, solar, and geothermal offer a relatively 
untapped solution to the region’s lack of power. The Cahora Bassa Dam in Mozambique 
harnesses energy from the Zambezi River, but two thirds of the harnessed resource is sold to 
wealthier consumers in South Africa. Construction of the dam displaced more than forty 
thousand people who now have power lines running through their villages that they do not even 
have access to. Energy, resources, and labor continue to be taken from Africa to support 
wealthier nations. This problematic example demonstrates that energy is available and accessible 
but that it is not being distributed in an ethical manner.  
A thermal map of Africa shows that the continent’s solar resource is greater than 
anywhere else in the world and that “the region starved for electricity is spoiled for sun” 
(Olopade, 2014). Naturally, Africa has huge advantages over the rest of the world. Buried metal 
and minerals have long overshadowed the potential for renewable energy while creating extreme 
and varied labor and environmental woes (Walsh, 2011). Fortunately, Africa’s fortunes are 
beginning to revolve around more creative, generative uses of this terrestrial birthright. 
Bloomberg reports that developing countries as a whole spent $72 billion on new renewable 
energy investments in 2010, more than what developed countries invested (Bloomberg, 2012). 
The solar market is set to double each year with more than two million lamps sold annually 
(DiCampo, 2011). Solar energy has enabled the continent to leapfrog “the mediocre stopgap of 
coal-fired power plants and evolve into a cleaner, more individually controlled paradigm. In that 
sense, the lack of effective organization at the state level may be the best thing that ever 
happened to Africa” (Olopade, 2014, 164). Due to years of prolonged lack of service provision, 







African countries do not have to spend nearly as much time and money on restructuring or 
removing harmful sources of emissions because they are limited to begin with.  
As is the trend across the continent, Smith, owner of Orun Energy, realized that power 
requirements must be met locally rather than waiting for transmission lines to arrive from the 
government. He developed a generator and batteries that could hook up to cell phone towers that 
were running on diesel (Olopade, 2014). He is not the first to work with telecoms on targeted 
energy efficiency. Dozens of African companies are now building businesses that fix the power 
problem for governments and corporations. In 2012, Nigerian company IHS, which runs four 
thousand wireless towers in five countries, launched the continent’s largest solar-powered cell 
site (Olopade, 2014). The solar farm keeps local lines of communication going while reducing 
carbon emissions by 24,000 tons annually (Greenhalgh, 2020). This project enables Nigerians to 
affordably replace harmful emissions and bypass formal energy providers while lowering 
overhead costs by utilizing wind and solar energy. Yet again, this is another example of a 
privately run, sustainable solution. Due to the African population’s current standards and the 
continent’s potential for renewable energy, Africa will come out ahead of the curve as countries 
around the world move away from the harmful emissions and exploitative, extraction-based 
practices that have been utilized to promote development and industry.  
 
Agriculture 
As people gain wealth, consumption increases across the board, from land to 
gasoline/diesel to food. As millions of people move to cities with hopes of economic success, a 
method is needed for offering services and an increased quality of life without sacrificing the 







environment. The way to do this is through public infrastructure, technology, environmentally 
conscious building materials, and more efficient land use for large scale farming. Unfortunately, 
except for technology, this method is not the current reality. Farming in much of Africa has 
become less efficient as people move to urban areas and irrigation systems and fertilizers remain 
severely lacking, making it nearly impossible to have reliable crops that can feed a rapidly 
growing population (Stein, 2020). As rural populations decrease due to limited economic 
opportunities, people can no longer have self-sufficient food chains. This calls for increased 
investment and development in the agricultural sector. 
 
 
Figure 6: The True Size of Africa. (Krause, 2011: http://static02.mediaite.com/geekosystem/uploads/2010/10/true-
size-of-africa.jpg) 
 







As shown in figure 5, all of Europe, China, India, and the contiguous United States can fit 
within the African continent. If a small nation such as The Netherlands can be the world’s 
second largest agricultural exporter, it is surely possible for African agriculture to meet the 
demands of a shifting population (Simone, 2015). 1.5 billion acres, more than half of the world’s 
uncultivated arable land, is in Africa but the yields and appeal of farming are small. “Bricks sell 
better than growing food. So instead, we grow bricks to buy food” (Olopade, 2014). The African 
continent has the most uncultivated arable land in the world with more than 600 million hectares 
and yet, instead of achieving self-sufficiency and stable food supply chains, commodity exports 
keep people from producing goods based on their own needs (World Bank, 2016). 
In Kenya, the average farmer is 65 years old, while the median age of the population is 
just 18. The struggle of making agriculture appealing to a young, tech-savvy generation is one of 
the biggest issues facing the region. Agriculture as an industry has a long history of association 
with peasants, but technological innovation is beginning to change that. The agricultural sector in 
Kenya employs 16 million smallholder farmers and makes up more than a quarter of Kenya’s 
GDP (Juma, 2011). So, headlines like “African Agri-Tech booms with 110% growth since 2016” 
are very encouraging, especially considering the propagative effects caused by faster, more 
efficient disruptive digital technologies (Juma, 2011). Due to the popularity of tech within the 
youth demographic, the intersection of agricultural and technological trends offers the potential 
to jumpstart innovation in the agriculture industry.  
Several Africa-based mobile ventures have used technology to cut down on the 
information asymmetries that keep farmers from maximizing income and harvest. Apps and non-
profits give farmers access to materials and daily crop price indices and even allow users to buy 







and sell orders from their mobile devices (Juma, 2011). Technology ensures maximum profit and 
less food waste while simplifying the trade process. An example of a mobile venture that 
maximizes income and production is The One Acre Fund that has already supplied one million 
smallholder farmers with everything they need to grow more food and earn more money. Nick 
Daniels, The One Acre Fund’s government relations analyst, says, “A lot of initiatives come 
from donors. USAID says, ‘You need to be doing this,’ DFID comes in and says, ‘Do this.’ The 
World Bank, Sweden, Denmark are all doing kinds of initiatives. They lack resources, there is a 
lack of focus. You have these poor extension workers who are being pulled in every direction” 
(Olopade, 2014). The rise in alternative agricultural support structures is a classic response to 
institutional failure. One Acre’s chief innovation has been financial. Farmers can pay One Acre 
five percent down for seeds and fertilizer and pay the nonprofit back in installments over time. 
The group even forgives farmer debt in the case of major crop failure, making the loan tied to 
effort rather than outcome. This trend of non-governmental organizations and technology 
replacing the supposed roles of government promotes self-sufficiency, individuality, and 
sustainability. A mobile app has succeeded in doing what foreign governments and world-
renowned NGOs have failed to do for decades due to the level of choice and trust placed on the 
farmers that use their service.  
 
Continuing the Trend of Decentralization 
The seeming inevitability of urbanization creates a distraction from what life on the 
ground looks like in rural parts of Sub-Saharan Africa where the promotion of self-sufficiency 
through technological advancement and smaller scale solutions is dominant. The African Union 







has proposed a railway network that would offer an alternate proposal of counter urbanization or 
villagization. With large infrastructure, renewable energy, informal and collaborative virtual 
networks, and jobs, the need to live in the city begins to dissipate. Sub-Saharan African cities 
and the countryside could share destiny—“a network of countless villages that partially congeal 
into city-like constructs” (Koolhaas, 2020). Formal steps to create this future have already begun. 
In 2013, Kenya decentralized power and returned it to the local and rural level. A new system 
established 48 distinct county governments across the country. Each new government continues 
on the trend for governments to “champion a model of development with the tall glass towers, 
spaghetti road networks, and busy looking streets. Open most of the county government websites 
and you are met by utopian master plans, often quite alien to the region” (Koolhaas, 2020). 
Clearly the trend of decentralizing power and establishing more local and region-specific plans is 
taking hold across the continent. It is as if each city or new development acts as its own provider 
with distinct economies and unique specializations.  
Cities within the same national borders can have entirely different structures and ways of 
life. The commonality here is that people have realized that relying on the government to 
regulate the economy, build infrastructure, and provide services will ensure that progress is not 
made (Olopade, 2014). Smaller scale, localized governments that rely on private sector 
investment is the future of African development. Whether that be through SEZs, satellite cities, 
innovative technology hubs, or simple decentralization of power, it has become abundantly clear 
that current national African governments do not have the means or support to provide what is 
being demanded by a growing and increasingly tech savvy population, which is why 
decentralization between national and local governments is a growing trend (Okonjo-Iweala and 







Ratha, 2011). Information is empowering, and more than 25% of Sub-Saharan Africans now 
have access to the internet compared to just 5% in 2010 (World Bank, 2021). As Nigerian author 
Dayo Olopade puts it, “It’s empowering first to our young people, in terms of education and 
business opportunities and sources of employment... To businesses who are ambitious enough to 
participate on the global scale, it gives those skills and capabilities better visibility to engage 
with people around the world and participate with an equal footing” (Olopade, 2014, 96). 
Africans can now access digital spaces that offer a way to bypass industrialization and its 
negative consequences. While web access figures are not where they are in more developed 
regions, urban African residents are far more likely to be using the world wide web. The 
potential of technology is grounded first in its redistribution of power, “Wires warp cyberspace 
in the same way wormholes warp physical space: the two points at opposite ends of a wire are, 
for informational purposes, the same point, even if they are on opposite sides of the planet” 
(Olopade, 2014). Africa can now be linked to the opposite side of the planet through cables that 
enable ordinary African people to access the same information as the wealthy world. Access to 
information has revolutionized healthcare, banking, and agriculture across the continent even for 
those individuals in the lowest income bracket. Instead of building new banks and hospitals and 
implementing industrialized farming, a simple mobile phone has allowed for affordable, fast, and 
replicable solutions. 
One of the most impressive and widely used examples of bypassing formality is Kenya’s 
M-Pesa, where connectivity can be converted to cash. M-Pesa transforms a twelve-button cell 
phone into an ATM. Users can deposit cash onto their mobile phone at one of the thirty-seven-
thousand official M-Pesa kiosks in Kenya (Hughs, 2018). With identification, a phone number, 







and a PIN code, they can withdraw the cash at another kiosk, perhaps located thousands of 
kilometers away. Dayo Olopade contends that technology has led to a flood of unprecedented 
innovation with regard to all aspects of development and that M-Pesa enables a range of 
financial services that can replace the need for formal banking (Olopade, 2014). In the event of 
emergency, funds can be wired to relatives or friends simply by using their phone number. 
Payment and collection of debts do not require face-to-face interactions. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
80% of the population is unbanked and without no access to credit (McKinsey, 2009). M-Pesa 
offers security, convenience, empowerment, and the long-sought ability for individuals in poor 
countries to build assets. The service is extremely popular and is used by 65% of Kenyan 
households, while transactions amount to more than $20 million daily—equivalent to 50% of 
Kenya’s annual GDP (Jack and Suri, 2011). In economies where banks are powerful and 
complex financial products are common, M-Pesa simply would not have developed. The share of 
adults using mobile money in OECD (intragovernmental economic organization with 37 member 
states) economies in Europe and the Americas is as low as 1%, while Africa has leapfrogged way 
ahead (Olopade, 2014). This is, yet again, an example of people taking what would be 
considered government responsibility in much of the OECD world into their own hands. 
Technology can offer banking, communication, trade, and access to information to spread 
rapidly around Sub-Saharan Africa all without reliance on formality and the state. Just as phases 
of industrialization may be bypassed due to the successes of the technology sector, access to 
banking is no longer a hurdle that low-income households must face.  
 
 








Through recent increased connectivity and access to technology, millions in Africa have 
the opportunity for self-direction to navigate around issues of fail-states and their lack of 
provisions. Anyone can be a participant in this new knowledge economy by having the 
opportunity to create solutions, such as apps, that serve the needs of everybody rather than 
waiting for a solution from the government or from Western developers. Technology is so 
important in Africa because it is unbiased and supports both formal and informal economies by 
reducing information asymmetries and creates the power to break the chains of institutional 
failure through new connective infrastructure and widespread mobile use around the continent.  
With the exception of South Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa is the only world region where 
per capita consumption of electricity is decreasing. Kanju solutions to private, dirty energy allow 
power requirements to be met locally through the use of generators and batteries as opposed to 
waiting for diesel powered transmission lines to arrive from the government. Orun Energy in 
Nigeria reported a 72% reduction in diesel use and is now offering large corporations relief from 
the expenses of formal energy (United Nations Environmental Program, 2011). Similarly, the 
Nigerian company IHS, which runs thousands of wireless towers across various countries, 
launched the continent’s largest solar-powered cell site, which reduces carbon emissions by 
24,000 tons per year (BusinessTech, 2012). These are just a few of examples of sustainable 
solutions found within the raw materials of daily life that can lead to local and global energy 
innovation.  
Informal solutions have also reached the agricultural industry. Without means to provide 
tractors, pesticides, irrigation systems, and genetically modified seeds, apps and even radio 







stations giving agricultural production tips offer solutions to stop soil erosion, protect new 
seedlings, and prevent birds from damaging crops. This information is not just vital for 
commercial farmers but also for part-time subsistence growers. A shift toward food 
sovereignty—ownership of the entire food production pipeline as opposed to just food access—is 
a growing trend across the continent. Solely through the dissemination of information, farmers 
can reduce dependency on inorganic inputs while increasing yields. The recycling pillar of kanju 
is most important with regard to agriculture. People can grow their own seeds, food, and 
fertilizer, thereby growing currency and sustenance without the input of outsiders and the 
harmful effects of industrial agriculture.  
As countries around the world scramble to become more sustainable and self-sufficient as 
the effects of climate change worsen, Africa is actually ahead of the curve. Lean economies have 
had to learn to balance food production and consumption, how to live without fossil fuels, and 
how to develop adaptive practices that can scale. A history of dealing with resource limitations 
and having the highest global potential for renewable energy puts Sub-Saharan Africa in a better 
position than fat economies with a culture of overconsumption and material obsessions. As the 
trend of satellite cities and corporate investment increases, the culture and consumption rates of 
fat economies may also be emulated. Physical removal from the hardships and struggles of living 
in Sub-Saharan Africa will create the same disconnect between production and consumption that 
many fat economies face, which further threatens the environment and perpetuates the 











Chapter V: Summary of Findings and Conclusion 
  
 Sub-Saharan Africa is at a crossroads. Millions of people across international borders 
agree that economic, social, and civic empowerment is necessary while also disagreeing on plans 
to achieve these goals. In Africa, one part of the population is decidedly Western-leaning, 
meaning that society is oriented around states, bureaucracies, international trade, and GDP-
centric calculations. Conversely, the vast majority of people live far more decentralized lives, 
relying on self-sufficiency and making do with less means since strong and functional states are 
still rare in modern Africa. Kanju, local organizing, and community-level governance must be 
prioritized over solutions that begin with inflexible external priorities and foreign interests. 
Grassroots processes and kanju solutions struggle for recognition and scale since they operate 
outside of formal institutions and are often diluted and ignored by modern Western governments 
who have their own self-interested motives.  
Unfortunately, the bulk of development in Sub-Saharan Africa is focused on 
multinational corporate investors, local business elites, and affluent consumers. Satellite cities 
and brain drain prove that exiting the system in preference for a more formal and structured 
environment is a popular choice. Governments do not have enough resources to start improving 
cities on their own, which is why foreign investment and developing planned cities from the 
ground up remain the most common trends. As more people continue to move to cities, housing 
and infrastructure are going to become larger problems. It is extremely unlikely that the private 
sector will use its means for what lower income populations need: decreasing the number of 
informal settlements, building affordable and efficient public transportation for urban Africans, 
and incorporating the informal sector of the economy.  







Further, due to the lack of government viability, increased Chinese development as 
means of service provision threatens the sustainability potential of Africa as carbon emissions 
are not monitored and pollution is an afterthought. This is a difficult trap to escape due to 
reliance on foreign investment and continued mutually beneficial trade relationships, but African 
economies cannot industrialize or become self-sufficient on an export and extraction-based 
economy. 
 Formality will always be at odds with more free and informal societies. Direct 
intervention and regulation remove creativity, argues Obiageli Ezekwesili, the former Nigerian 
education minister who now leads an institute committed to building private-sector capacity 
(Mbembe, 2001). A hybrid solution that takes infrastructural and organizational knowledge from 
the West and combines it with the sustainable and inventive solutions of Sub-Saharan Africa will 
create innovations that build on both institutional and informal frameworks that can lead to more 
impactful and effective development. Development necessities such as health care, electricity, 
and education have flourished outside the reach of the state, and, as private companies provide 
services that governments have failed to offer, their roles and motives are increasingly 
questioned. A true hybrid institution can utilize techniques learned from lean economies to 
improve the lives of Africans rather than imposing formal institutions that create further 
divisions and exacerbate spatial and economic inequalities. Satellite cities and ground-up 
development import Western systems to Africa for the people who are already participating in 
formal institutions and do not actually fix any of the issues of urban life on the continent for 
those who do not or cannot accept formality and strict regulations as a way of life.  







 The purpose of this thesis is to provide an overview of the misconceptions about Sub-
Saharan Africa and to point out the clash between formal institutions and the informal sector. 
Beyond this, the examples given are to provide an understanding of what is actually occurring on 
the ground and how the two systems blend together. Both sides have a lot to learn and can 
benefit from the other, but it is time for the asymmetries of this relationship to be examined and 
untangled. The complexities and relationships of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa create 
developmental challenges that are unlike anywhere else. Sub-Saharan Africa will have striking 
economic significance in the twenty-first century as hundreds of millions of people urbanize, 
new spaces are built from the ground up, and trade relationships develop.  
The United Nations estimates that, by 2050, Africa will be the source of roughly half the 
births on this planet and, by 2100, it will comprise approximately 30–40% of the global 
population (Zinkina and Korotayev, 2014). Much uncertainty surrounds the shockwave of this 
population boom. Scholars, policy makers, and investors must all postulate as to whether this 
growth will set Africa on a path for labor intensive industrialization or whether national incomes 
will be outpaced by the rising populations. One factor is certain, though—Africa will become a 
home to the youngest and most populous consumer market in the world. The impact of this 
market will be determined by their exposure to intercontinental and extracontinental producers 
through trade policy (Sampath 2015). Whether African countries integrate their markets with one 
another or whether they form economic relationships with overseas countries will have 
staggering implications for the continent with respect to creating political autonomy, accelerating 
market diversification, and working toward poverty alleviation.  







Clearly, there is a wide array of challenges on the path toward regional integration. Poor 
infrastructure, inconsistent implementation, and the clash between formal and informal 
economies disincentivize supply chains from moving between borders. On the other hand, the 
benefits from market integration justify the need to overcome these obstacles. Market integration 
will spur product diversification, catalyze economic growth, create a focus on renewable energy 
and sustainability, and help foster a more autonomous and stable continent. Currently, the 
relationships Africa has formed with China and the Western world do not work toward these 
goals. Instead, trade with foreign powers tends to lock Africa into extractive specializations, 
while other nations reap the gains from growing demand and influence policy decisions. In the 
wake of Africa’s population boom, a policy agenda oriented around better connecting markets 
can be transformative.   
Massive projects like special economic zones and satellite cities are often viewed as 
avenues of hope and economic prosperity, but in reality, without political and social change, 
economic development is limited and the vast majority of Africans will not receive their fair 
share of profit and opportunity. Instead of African states being taken advantage of, there is an 
opportunity to use this development, new investment, and technological advancement to educate 
large portions of the population in order for larger numbers of people to benefit. The 
urbanization of Sub-Saharan Africa comes at a time when the world must begin to deal with the 
repercussions of destructive and environmentally harmful development. The ideals of kanju 
development and the more environmentally conscious solutions to service provision must be 
accepted and understood by the global community so that unsustainable aspects of a globalized 
economy can transition to become less wasteful, extractive, and exclusionary. 
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